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INTEREST-FREE LOANS AS
A TAX PLANNING DEVICE-
CROWN V. COMMISSIONER
Under the provisions of the gift tax statutes, a transfer of property for less
than full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth results in
the imposition of a gift tax.' If a taxpayer transfers a building with a fair
market value of $100,000 to his child in exchange for a $100,000 term note
bearing a low rate of interest, the difference between the fair market value
of the property and the present discounted value 2 of the note is a taxable
gift. 3 If, however, a taxpayer transfers $100,000 to his child as an interest-
free loan in exchange for the child's promise to repay on demand and the
child buys a $100,000 building, there is no taxable gift. 4 Although in both
examples the taxpayer has conferred upon the child the benefit of the pres-
ent use of money, the gift tax consequences are entirely different. Why?
This question represents neither a law student's nightmare nor a tax lawyer's
dream. Rather, this incongruity is a result of the Seventh Circuit's recent
decision in Crown v. Commissioner.5
Lester Crown and his two brothers were equal owners of Areljay Com-
pany, an Illinois partnership. The partnership made demand and open ac-
count interest-free loans 6 totalling over eighteen million dollars to twenty-
four trusts established to benefit twelve of the partners' children and other
1. I.R.C. § 2512(b) provides:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property
exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift, and shall be in-
cluded in computing the amount of gifts made during the calendar quarter.
2. For purposes of this Note the "present discounted value" simply means the dollar value
of the note on the date of transfer as opposed to the date of collection.
3. See Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953). In Blackburn a taxpayer trans-
ferred a building to her children and took back a term note bearing interest below the then
prevailing market rate. Faced with paying a gift tax the taxpayer argued that the amount of the
gift resulting from the transfer should be measured by the difference between the fair market
value of the property less the face value of the note. The Commissioner argued that' the amount
of the gift should be measured by the difference between the fair market value of the property
and the discounted or fair market value of the note received. The Tax Court decided in favor of
the Commissioner, holding that a gift includes the value of the use of money foregone by
taxpayer's accepting a low rate of interest.
4. See, e.g., Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.
1978), pet. for rehearing denied, Nov. 30, 1978; Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73
(N.D. Tex. 1966) (holding that interest-free demand loans between family members were not
taxable gifts).
5. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
6. The court held that there was no practical difference between the open account and
demand loans. 585 F.2d at 237 n.9. The demand notes provided that interest at the rate of six
percent per annum was payable after demand. No demand was made in 1967. Brief for Appel-
lant at 6, 585 F.2d at 235.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:785
close relatives. 7 In 1973, six years after the loans were made, the Commis-
sioner issued a notice of deficiency asserting that the loans to the trusts
resulted in taxable gifts totalling $1,086,407.75, one-third of which was tax-
able to Lester Crown."
The Tax Court held that a taxpayer was not under an obligation to charge
interest on loans to family members and, for policy reasons, concluded that
the decision to subject such transactions to the gift tax should come through
congressional legislation, not judicial interpretation. 9 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court on identical grounds holding that the value of the use
of money loaned interest-free and on a demand basis does not constitute a
gift.' 0  The decision thus, albeit indirectly," also affirmed a long line of
cases which, in the corporate context, had refused to subject non-interest
bearing obligations to taxation absent explicit statutory authority.' 2
7. As of December 31, 1967, loans represented by demand notes totaled $2,073,649 (13%)
and loans on open account totaled $15,956,375 (87%). Brief for Appellant at 6, Brief for Appel-
lee at 3 & 6, 67 T.C. at 1061, 585 F.2d at 235. The Commissioner computed the tax by
applying a six percent interest rate to the average daily balance of outstanding loans during
1967. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, 585 F.2d at 235.
8. Brief for Appellee at 4, 585 F.2d at 235. The Commissioner later conceded that because
the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion applies in the case of interest-free loans, the amount of
taxable gifts should be adjusted to reflect an annual exclusion of $3,000 for each of nine trusts
established for persons for whom an annual exclusion had not been claimed. Brief for Appellant
at 19 n.12.
It should be noted that in 1971 the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to the partner-
ship asserting that the loans here at issue resulted in interest-income to the partnership in 1967.
The matter is presently before the Tax Court in Crown v. Commissioner, Docket No. 8889-76.
9. 67 T.C. 1060, 1063-65 (1977).
10. 585 F.2d at 235-40.
11. 585 F.2d 234. Although there have been other cases dealing with the taxation of
interest-free loans under the income tax, the Commissioner has only recently begun to assert
that interest-free loans between family members give rise to a taxable gift under the gift tax
statutes. See Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); 585 F.2d at 240-41.
12. Id.; see, e.g., Joseph Lupowitz Sons v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974)
(interest-free loans between commonly controlled corporations do not amount to a constructive
dividend); J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) (loan from controlled corporation to controlling
stockholders was not taxable because interest income to the corporation would be offset by a
correlative interest deduction by the stockholders). It was only after the promulgation of section
482 and Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(6), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, which specifically empowered
the Commissioner to allocate income among commonly controlled business entities, that the
courts began to permit the imputation of interest income even where no actual profits resulted
from the interest-free loan. See Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974);
Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner,
453 F.2d 1144, 1156 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972) (recognizing in dicta that
to hold otherwise ignores economic reality).
The same legal analysis prevailed with respect to installment sales. The courts refused to
impute interest income until the passage of section 483, which prevents a seller from converting
interest income (ordinary income) into capital gains by requiring the seller to treat as unstated
interest a part of each installment payment. See Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961), aff'd, 380
U.S. 563 (1965); Pretzer v. United States, 61-1 USTC 9477 (D. Ariz. 1961).
CROWN V. COMMISSIONER
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit failed
to establish any adequate legal or logical basis for excluding interest-free
demand obligations from the broad sweep of the gift tax statutes. Rather, the
court's reasoning reflects (1) an unnecessary preoccupation with the problem
of valuing the amount of a gift resulting from an interest-free demand obliga-
tion in the intra-family context, and (2) a decision to defer to the legislature
because of the social ramifications of holding intra-family loans to be taxable
gifts.
This Note will first examine the legislative history and purpose behind the
gift tax and the interrelation of the gift tax with the estate and income taxes.
It will then analyze the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Crown and criticize the
reasoning underlying the court's holding that interest-free loans are not tax-
able gifts. Finally, turning to the impact of the decision, the Note will point
out the inconsistent tax consequences which result from the Crown decision
and will illustrate how interest-free loans can be used as a tax planning de-
vice.
BACKGROUND: THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE GIFT TAx
The gift tax provisions that form the basis of the present code were
enacted in 1932.13 As stated in the House and Senate reports, Congress'
purpose in passing a gift tax was to supplement both the income and the
estate taxes by discouraging gratuitous lifetime transfers of property.' 4 In
the case of the income tax, the imposition of a gift tax serves to discourage
taxpayers in the higher brackets from giving away income producing prop-
erty so as to avoid high income tax rates. 15 In the estate tax setting, the gift
tax prevents a tax-free depletion of donor's estate.
16
At the outset, it was clear that Congress intended the gift tax provisions to
be broadly interpreted to "cover ... all transactions . . . to the extent . . .
that property or a property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon
another, regardless of the means or device employed in its accomplish-
ment." 17 The language of the statute itself evidences the sweeping nature
of the gift tax. Section 250118 imposes a gift tax on every transfer of property
13. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501-507, 47 Stat. 169.
14. H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 40 (1932), which provides inter alia:
It will tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that distribution of future
income from the donated property may be to a number of persons, with the result
that the taxes imposed by the higher brackets of the income tax law are avoided. It
will also tend to discourage transfers for the purpose of avoiding the estate tax.
See generally Harriss, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531 (1940).
15. Hereinafter referred to as "income splitting". See H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 14, at
27; S. REP. No. 665 supra note 14, at 39.
16. H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 14, at 28; S. REP. No. 665 supra note 14, at 40.
17. H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 14, at 27; S. REP. No. 665, supra note 14, at 39.
18. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) provides:
A tax . . . is hereby imposed for each calendar quarter on the transfer of property
by gift during such calendar quarter by any individual, resident or nonresident.
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by gift, and section 2511(a) 19 provides that the form of the transfer is im-
material. The "tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply whether the transfer
is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether
the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible .... "20 Finally, sec-
tion 2512(b) 2 1 requires that, where property is transferred for less than full
consideration in money or money's worth, the excess must be deemed to be
a gift.
Accordingly, the courts have construed the gift tax provisions most liber-
ally. In Commissioner v. Wemyss, 22 the United States Supreme Court de-
termined that sections 2501 and 2512(b) must be read together. Thus, it has
been said that section 2512(b) provides an objective test that dispenses with
the requirement of donative intent and taxes every transaction where
adequate consideration is not received in return.2 3  As Justice Frankfurter
observed, Congress desired "to hit all the protean arrangements which the
wit of man can devise that are not business transactions within the meaning
of ordinary speech. ... 24
In Crown, however, notwithstanding the broad purpose of the gift tax
statutes and the liberal construction they have been accorded, the Seventh
Circuit proceeded to construe narrowly the applicability of the gift tax in the
context of interest-free loans.
THE COURT'S REASONING
The Purpose of the Gift Tax
To support its holding that non-interest bearing loans do not give rise to a
taxable gift, the court first considered whether such transfers were within
the contemplation of the gift tax. The court recognized that Congress in-
tended that the statutes protect the income and estate taxes, 25 and explicitly
found that interest-free loans encouraged income splitting and were there-
fore inimicable to one of the two purposes of the gift tax. Nonetheless, the
court did not find this sufficient to render the loans taxable. 26 The question
of whether the estate tax was jeopardized by the use of interest-free loans,
however, presented more difficulty.
19. I.R.C. § 2511(a).
20. Id.
21. See note 1 supra.
22. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
23. Id. at 306. Numerous cases have recognized the broad sweep of the gift tax provisions.
See, e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 534 (1946) ("[tlax liability should
depend upon the subtle refinements of corporate finance no more than it does upon the niceties
of conveyancing"); Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 187 (1943) (the purpose of the gift tax
was to reach every kind of gratuitous transfer); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943)
(the language of the gift tax is broad enough to include all types of property interests whether
they are tangible or intangible, conceptual or contingent).
24. 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945).
25. 585 F.2d at 235-36; see also notes 13-24 and accompanying text supra.
26. 585 F.2d at 236.
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The Seventh Circuit's first step in finding that the estate tax was not cir-
cumvented by the use of interest-free loans consisted of determining
whether the estate of the lender was depleted. The Commissioner argued
that because the present value of a promise to repay a term loan is less than
the face amount of the loan, the same must be true of a demand loan. 27
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that because the estate con-
ceivably could demand immediate repayment of the loan were the lender to
die, the value of the loan would approach face value for estate tax pur-
poses. 28  Therefore, the court found that the estate would not be depleted.
The Commissioner next argued that, as a practical result, the estate of the
lender would be depleted by the amount of interest foregone. 29 For exam-
ple, had the taxpayer simply deposited the money in a low-interest bank
account bearing six percent interest per annum, he would have earned a
return of $1,086,407.75, the amount the Commissioner here sought to tax as
a gift. The court recognized that the taxpayer had placed his relatives in the
position of being able to enjoy the economic benefit of his capital 30 and that
there might be policy reasons for wanting to tax such transactions. 3' The
majority, however, reasoned that a taxpayer is not obligated to earn a return
on his money. In the absence of authority providing that the estate tax was
meant to tax a decedent's potential estate, such could not be presumed to be
Congress' intent.32
After the Seventh Circuit found that interest-free loans permit circumven-
tion of the income tax but fail to deplete a decedent's estate, it proceeded to
reject the Commissioner's argument that because the failure to subject
interest-free loans to the gift tax would result in inconsistent gift tax con-
sequences such loans should be taxed. 33 The court reasoned that, not-
withstanding these inconsistencies, the interest-free use of money would not
constitute a taxable gift unless such loans were shown to be within the con-
templation of the gift tax. 34 Two issues therefore were presented:
27. Id. As the court pointed out, in the situation of a demand loan, the fair market value of
the loan will increase as the date of maturity draws closer. On the date of maturity, face value
and fair market value will be equal. Id. at 236 n.4.
28. Id. The court recognized that the value on the date of death might be somewhat less
than the face value due to the lack of creditworthiness of the borrower or due to delays in actual
payment. Id. at 236 n.5.
29. Id. at 236.
30. Id. at 236-37.
31. Id. at 236 n.6, quoting, LOWNDES, KRAMER & MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES § 26.15 (3d ed. 1974), which states: "'The opportunities for deflection of the relative
income tax burdens clearly appear to distinguish interest-free loans from gifts of services and
justify the backstop use of the gift tax to minimize the potential loss of the federal fisc."
32. 585 F.2d at 237.
33. See notes 117-127 and accompanying text infra.
34. 585 F.2d at 237.
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(1) Is the transfer of property ($18,000,000 dollars) in the form of a loan
not bearing interest a "gift" of a property interest;3 5 and
(2) If it is an interest in property, how is the "gift" to be valued?
Is There a Gift of an Interest in Property?
The court characterized the Commissioner's argument as consisting of
three separate attacks, each of which allegedly required inclusion of the
loans under the gift tax: (1) at the time of the loan an unequal exchange
occurred requiring inclusion under section 2512 because the present value of
the promise to repay the loan was less than the amount of money loaned; (2)
at the time of the loan there was an outright gift of a property interest,
namely the right to use the money interest-free; and (3) even if there was no
outright gift or unequal exchange, 3 6 the "gift" of the right to use money
interest-free began at the time the loan was made and was completed each
day the lender failed to demand repayment.3 7
The Commissioner first argued that the transfer of interest-free money
constituted an unequal exchange. Under this approach, the lender is seen as
having transferred property, in the form of money, in exchange for a prom-
ise that a like amount of money will be repaid upon demand. Because a
promise to repay in the future is of less value than the money loaned,3 8 the
Commissioner asserted that under section 2512(b) 39 this differential resulted
in a taxable gift. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that
not only was there no evidence that demand notes systematically trade at a
discounted value, but also that at the time of the loan the value of the right
to repayment could not be determined. The court noted that, theoretically,
the lender could instantaneously demand repayment. Thus, at the time of
the loan the difference between the face value and discounted value of the
loan might range anywhere "between zero and the face amount. " 40
The court characterized the Commissioner's second argument as suggest-
ing that, at the time of the loan, there was an outright gift of the right to the
interest-free use of money for an indefinite period. Using a real property
analogy, the court likened a borrower's interest-free loan to a tenancy at will
in a sum of money, with the lender retaining a reversion. 4 1 Under section
35. Here, the "interest in property" would be the amount of interest that would have been
charged in an arm's length transaction.
36. To clarify, it should be noted that for purposes of this third argument, the Commis-
sioner was not conceding that the exchange was an equal one, but rather that because, if only in
theory, the lender can demand instantaneous repayment, the "gift" of the use of money only
has value if the lender refrains from demanding repayment. Therefore, the "gift" should be
viewed as complete only after each day, month, or quarter during which the borrower had free
use of the money.
37. 585 F.2d at 238-40.
38. Id. at 238.
39. See note 1 supra.
40. 585 F.2d at 238.
41. Id. at 239.
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2501 such an interest would be taxable as a gift of property. 42 Looking to
the legislative history of the gift tax statutes, 43 however, the court found that
the recipient of such an "at will" interest does not have a legally enforceable
interest of exchangeable value." Therefore, it concluded, since the right to
use money interest-free is not a gift of property, it cannot be considered a
taxable gift under section 2501.
What the court characterized as the Commissioner's third and final argu-
ment was his contention that the right to the interest-free use of money for
the period during which the loan remained outstanding resulted in a taxable
gift. In other words, under this analysis the Commissioner argued that the
gift was not complete on the date of the loan, but was completed at the end
of each day during which the borrower had free use of the money. Here the
court viewed the question as whether the right to the use of money is a
transfer of a property interest as that term is used under the gift tax provi-
sions. The court held that it was not.4 5  Moreover, the court reasoned that
to view the transaction as a continuous gift would require the lender, at
least hypothetically, to first receive interest payments and then forgive
them. To so hold would require a lender to charge interest and thereby
would impose an obligation on a taxpayer to cause his money to earn
money. 46
The Problem of Valuation
Inextricably intertwined with the question of whether a gift had occurred
was the problem of how to determine the amount of the gift. 47 The Com-
missioner proposed a wait and see approach,4 suggesting that the amount of
the gift could be measured by applying the then prevailing market rate of
interest to the outstanding balance at the end of each taxable quarter during
42. See note 18 supra.
43. H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 14, at 27; S. REP. No. 665, supra note 14, at 39.
44. The court stated: "[W]e have seen no authority suggesting that the recipient of a loan
payable on demand has a legally protectable interest vis-a-vis the lender. Moreover, the Com-
missioner has produced no evidence showing that the borrower's 'at will' interest has an ex-
changeable value." 585 F.2d at 239.
45. The court reasoned that, in the context of the gift tax statutes, the mere use of property
does not amount to a property right. 585 F.2d at 240.
46. id.
47. Although the court's previous disposition of the Commissioner's arguments would be
sufficient to support a finding that no gift had occurred, the court nevertheless proceeded to
consider the question of valuation.
48. This approach was promulgated in Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408. Under the facts of
this ruling, a son's wholly owned corporation borrowed $250,000 from the son's father, issuing in
return a note for $50,000 payable in ten years and a second demand note in the face amount of
$200,000. Neither note bore interest. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that there was a
taxable gift of the difference between the face amount of the term note and its present dis-
counted value. As to the demand note, the ruling concluded that the lender had made a taxable
gift at the end of each quarter during which no demand had been made.
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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
which the loan remained outstanding. 49 The Seventh Circuit rejected this
contention as it applied to all three of the Commissioner's arguments.
First, with regard to the unequal exchange and outright gift arguments,
the court read section 2512(b) 50 to assume implicitly that the values being
compared would be measured at the same point in time.5 1 Therefore, if as
would be the case under the unequal exchange or outright gift arguments,
the gift is deemed to occur on the date that the loan is made, the value of
the gift cannot be determined subsequently. The court supports this premise
by reasoning that, if the Commissioner's measure of value were to be per-
mitted, it would not accurately reflect the difference in value between the
money loaned and the borrower's promise to repay. This is illustrated by the
fact that if the loan were to remain outstanding for any length of time,
measuring interest at the end of each taxable quarter might well result in
the lender paying more gift tax than he would have had there been an out-
right gift of the principal. 52  Secondly, the court found the Commissioner's
wait and see approach to be deficient because it implied that, at the time
the loan was made, it was "predetermined" that the loan would remain out-
standing for the taxable quarter. 53
It was with respect to the Commissioner's third argument that the court
encountered the problem of separating the question of whether there was a
gift from the question of valuation. Although it found the Commissioner's
proposed method of valuation to be compatible with his argument that a
continuous gift had occurred, the Seventh Circuit summarily reasoned that
because a taxpayer is under no legal obligation to charge interest there was
no gift and, therefore, there was nothing requiring valuation.
The Seventh Circuit thus disposed of all three of the Commissioner's ar-
guments for taxing an interest-free loan as a gift. In conclusion, the court
advanced several reasons in support of its holding. First, the majority noted
that other courts had consistently refused to subject interest-free loans to
taxation absent an express statute or regulation. 54  Furthermore, it recog-
nized that not only would it be difficult to determine an appropriate interest
rate,55 it would be administratively difficult to subject small loans to any
tax. 56  Finally, the fact that the Commissioner had only recently begun to
49. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
50. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
51. 585 F.2d at 239.
52. Id. at 239 n. 14. For example, if a lender made a $10,000 interest-free loan and interest
were imputed at a rate of ten percent, he would be treated as having made a $1,000 gift at the
end of each year during which the loan remained outstanding. If the loan were not repaid for
twenty years, it would result in a gift tax liability on $20,000. If, however, the lender had
simply made an outright gift of the principal rather than making an interest-free loan, he would
incur a gift tax on only $10,000.
53. Id. at 239; see notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
54. id. at 240.
55. Id. at 240-41.
56. Id. at 241.
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assert that interest-free loans were taxable gifts led the court to conclude
that it would be inequitable to subject the loans at issue to the gift tax. 5 7
CRITICISM OF THE COURT'S OPINION
Congressional Purpose
In examining whether interest-free loans conflict with the purposes of the
gift tax, 58 the Seventh Circuit failed adequately to consider the income split-
ting ramifications of the decision. 59  As the United States Supreme Court
has recognized, the gift tax was passed not only to protect the estate tax but
also to protect the income tax by preventing income splitting. 60  Clearly,
the purpose of the gift tax must be viewed as dual rather than disjunctive.
In dealing with the question of whether interest-free loans deplete the
taxable estate of the lender, the court pointed to a policy reason for distin-
guishing interest-free loans from gifts of services, which previously had been
held not to deplete the estate: 61
[U]nder our system a taxpayer is not under any duty to cultivate the fruits
of his capital (or labor) and will not be taxed as if he had when he hasn't.
However, by actively placing others in a position to enjoy the fruits of his
capital, the taxpayer in a sense vicariously 'realizes' the economic potential
thereof.6
2
Although this rationale would appear to support the inclusion of interest-
free loans under the gift tax, the court rejected this argument insofar as it
related to the protection of the estate tax, reasoning that the estate tax was
meant to tax a decedent's actual, not potential, estate.
It is interesting that this policy rationale would directly support a finding
that a gift had been made so as to prevent taxpayers from using interest-free
loans to avoid income taxes. The court, however, failed adequately to con-
sider this fact, apparently deciding that although the use of interest-free
loans might result in an avoidance of income tax, that fact alone would not
be sufficient to find that a gift had occurred. 63  As a result, a giant loophole
has been opened.
57. Id.
58. See notes 13-24 and accompanying text supra.
59. 585 F.2d at 235-37.
60. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 n.1 (1943); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S.
440, 450 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Seventh Circuit itself noted: "Petitioner argues
that protection of the income tax is only a 'natural consequence' of the gift tax rather than one of
its purposes. But there is authority to the contrary." 585 F.2d at 235 n.2.
61. 585 F.2d at 236 n.6; see Rev. Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 C.B. 21; Commissioner v. Hogle, 165
F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947).
62. 585 F.2d at 236 (emphasis added). The court further noted that this may "serve as a
theoretical basis for distinguishing gifts such as those involved here from situations where the
taxpayer lets his productive properties lie totally fallow." Id. at 237.
63. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated: "We do not mean to express any view with regard to the
Commissioner's contention, not part of this appeal, that the loans in this case gave rise to
1979]
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The Plain Meaning of the Gift Tax Statutes
Not only did the Seventh Circuit give short shrift to the purpose behind
the gift tax, it also disregarded the plain meaning of the statutes. The court
characterized the Internal Revenue Service's position as constituting a
three-pronged attack on the gift taxation of interest-free loans resulting in:
(1) an unequal exchange under section 2512; (2) an outright gift under sec-
tion 2501; or (3) a continuous gift. 64 Although the majority did not misstate
the Commissioner's position, it apparently missed its major thrust.
Section 2512(b) provides an objective test for determining if a transfer
under section 2501 constitutes a "gift." Simply put, section 2512(b) provides
that the difference in value between property transferred and property received
"shall be deemed a gift."6 5  In Commissioner v. Wemyss, 66 the Supreme
Court held that sections 2501 and 2512(b) are to be read together, reasoning
that as Congress directed them to the same purpose, they should not be
separated in application. 67  Moreover, as the Court pointed out, section
2512 provides a workable external test. The only question to be resolved
under section 2512 is whether the value of what is received is equivalent to
the value of what was given. If not, a gift tax must be assessed. 6 8
In propounding this objective test, the Supreme Court recognized that
Congress specifically intended to avoid property definitions such as those
that the Seventh Circuit employed in determining whether a transfer of
property under section 2501 had occurred.69 In Smith v. Shaughnessy, the
Court rejected the suggestion that the complexity of a property interest can
defeat the gift tax. 70 The Court emphasized that Congress has steadfastly
sought to close tax loopholes created by ingenious trust instruments and that
the broad language of the gift tax is meant to encompass even conceptual or
contingent property interests. 7'
The Problem of Valuation Did Not Warrant
the Court's Deternination That No Gift Had Occurred
Had the court followed the Supreme Court's decision in Shaughnessy 72
and applied the workable external test sanctioned by Congress and reiter-
ated in Wemyss, 73 it would have found that there had been a transfer of an
constructive income to the Areljay partners taxable under the income tax." Id. at 236 n.3. The
issue has not yet been decided. See Crown v. Commissioner, Docket No. 8889-76.
64. 585 F.2d at 237-40; see notes 37-46 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes I and 18 supra.
66. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
67. Id. at 306.
68. Id.; see note I supra.
69. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
70. Id. at 180.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 324 U.S. 303.
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interest in property which resulted in an unequal exchange. Viewed in this
light, it becomes clear that in focusing on the problem of valuation the court
lost sight of the major issue of whether a gift was made. The majority's
acknowledgment that an unequal exchange had occurred because "instan-
taneous repayment is impossible" 74 was sufficient to bring interest-free loans
within the purview of the gift tax statutes. The only question became one of
valuation. It was the court's rejection of the mode of valuation proposed by
the Commissioner that led the majority to hold that a gift not occurred. 75
In this regard, it is significant to point out that the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion is in conflict with its own holding in Manson v. United States,76 which
the majority dismissed as only indirect authority for taxing interest-free loans
under section 2512(b). 77  In Manson, a taxpayer sold stock to a charity in
exchange for a small amount of cash and a long-term low-interest note. The
Seventh Circuit held that, for purposes of the income tax, the taxpayer had
made a gift of the amount of interest that he could have charged. 78  It ap-
pears that the only bases for distinguishing Crown from cases such as Man-
son are that Crown arose under the gift tax rather than the income tax, and
it dealt with a demand rather than term obligation. 79  When a demand note
is transferred, the amount of the gift cannot be measured accurately at the
time the loan is made. Therefore, there is no taxable gift. If a term note is
used, because the amount of the gift can be ascertained at the time the loan
is made, the transfer results in a taxable gift. 80 The distinction is not only
illogical, but also, as the Tax Court dissent noted, to suggest that the right to
use money does not have value ignores economic reality. 8 1 Some may pre-
fer the down-home approach of Judge Van Pelt, the lone dissenter in the
74. 585 F.2d at 238. See also, id. at n.13: "'If payment is demanded immediately after the
loan is made, the present value will approximate the face value. If the loan remains perpetually
unpaid, the present value approaches zero." (emphasis added).
75. See notes 47-57 and accompanying text supra.
76. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975). Although Manson arose under the income tax statutes, the
court's holding that a charitable gift resulted from the failure to charge an adequate amount of
interest supports the proposition that the use of money has value.
77. 585 F.2d at 240.
78. 513 F.2d at 29-30.
79. Id. See Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953) (holding that receipt of a low-
interest term note constitutes a taxable gift); see also note 3 and accompanying text supra.
80. Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953); Manson v. United States, note 78
supra; see also Duhl and Fine, New Case Allowing Interest Deduction Calls For Reappraisal of
No-Interest Loans, 44 J. OF TAXATION 34, 38 (1976); Note, Crown v. Commissioner: Gift Taxa-
tion and Interest-Free Loans Among Family Members, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 361, 372
(1977).
81. 67 T.C. 1060, 1065 (Simpson, J., dissenting); cf. Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.
204 (1953), note 3 and accompanying text supra. It is illogical to reason that a taxpayer should
be liable for a gift tax if he transfers property at a low interest rate, but not liable for any tax if
he charges a low rate of interest or no interest on a transfer of money. In both situations, the
issue is whether the use of money has value and, if so, whether that value constitutes a gift.
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Seventh Circuit's opinion in Crown, who summed up his feelings about the
majority decision by stating it "just ain't right." 82
Proceeding on the premise that, under the objective test enunciated in
Shaughnessy and Wemyss, 83 a taxable gift occurred, the question becomes
one of placing a value on a demand obligation. Ostensibly, the Commis-
sioner conceded, and the court found, that simply because the lender can
demand repayment one minute or one hundred years after the loan is made,
at the time of a "gift" of interest-free use of money, its value is unknown and
undeterminable.8 4 The Seventh Circuit, nonetheless, rejected the Commis-
sioner's contention that the amount of the gift could be measured at the end
of each taxable quarter during which the loan remained outstanding.8 5
Furthermore, the court held that such a mode of valuation would not truly
reflect the value of the gift at the time it was made.8 6  It is submitted,
however, that the wait and see approach proposed by the Commissioner is
not only reasonable, it is the only method of valuation that would bear any
relation to the economic value of money loaned over an indefinite period of
time. 87
This problem is not unique or unprecedented. In the context of a revoca-
ble trust, the propriety of valuing a gift after the time of the transfer is well
established.8 8 Thus, where A creates a revocable trust naming B as ben-
eficiary, a gift to B of thae corpus is effective when A relinquishes the power
to revoke or the power is otherwise terminated in B's favor.8 9 So too, if the
taxpayers in Crown had transferred the $18,000,000 to a short-term or re-
vocable trust with income payable to their children and relatives, there
would have been a taxable gift of the income interest when it was received
by the beneficiaries. 90 There seems to be little reason for not viewing
interest-free loans the same way.
The majority also gave lip service to the possibility that a quarterly valua-
tion would result in a lender paying more in the way of gift taxes than he
82. 585 F.2d at 242 (Van Pelt, J., dissenting).
83. See notes 65-75 and accompanying text supra.
84. 585 F.2d at 238.
85. See notes 47-57 and accompanying text supra.
86. 585 F.2d at 239.
87. See generally O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1085,
1088-94 (1974); Note, Gift Taxes-Interest-Free Demand Loans Are Not Taxable Gifts-
Johnson v. United States, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 1014, 1020 (1967); cf. Note, Interest-Free Loans
and the Gift Tax: Crown v. Commissioner, 38 OHIO ST. L. J. 903, 917-18 (1977) (suggesting
that a flat rate is preferable).
88. See Helvering v. McCormack, 135 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Warner,
127 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942).
89. H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 14, at 28; S. REP. No. 665, supra note 14, at 40. The
income payments to B in the interim would be gifts taxable to A in the year B received them.
90. See cases cited in note 88 supra; see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958) and §
25.2511-2(0 (1958); Westover, Gift Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 19 STAN. L. REv. 870,
874-75 (1967); Note, Income and Gift Tax Implications of Interest-Free Loans Between Rela-
tives, B.Y.L. REV. 155, 158 (1978).
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would have had he made an outright gift of the principal. 91 However, as
the court went on to point out, "the paradox is one of nominal rather than
real values." 92 Because a quarterly assessment would result in the lender
having the present use of the money, the economic result would be about
the same whether the gift was taxed at the time of the loan or on a quarterly
basis. 93 Such a result also would be consistent with the tax treatment of
revocable trusts where income payments made to the beneficiary are taxed
to the grantor at the time of distribution. 94
Had the court permitted a quarterly valuation, there are three methods
which could have been used to value the amount of interest that should have
been imputed to the lender: (1) the income actually earned by the borrower;
(2) a flat rate; and (3) the average prime rate of interest. 95 Of these three,
the average rate of interest, which was used by the Commissioner in Crown,
is the most reasonable. 96
The six percent interest rate proposed by the Commissioner in Crown was
based on the average prime rate of interest during 1967, the taxable period
at issue. 97  Presumably, this measure was chosen because there is no reli-
able market rate for demand obligations. 98 Absent a reliable fair market
rate similar to the amount that would have been charged in an arm's length
transaction, the average prime rate provides the most reliable indicator of
the value of the use of money although it fails to take into account the
creditworthiness of the debtor.99 Even so, the Commissioner's method of
valuation appears to be the fairest to both the taxpayer and the government
as well as the most administratively efficient.' 0 0 Unlike an assessment based
91. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
92. 585 F.2d at 239 n.14.
93. Id.
94. As regards the use of revocable trusts and interest-free demand loans, it would seem
consistent to view any possible differential between the tax that would be imposed at the time
of the transfer (were the gift irrevocable or the interest-free loan a term obligation) and the gift
tax imposed subsequent to the transfer as the cost to the grantor/lender of retaining control over
the principal.
It should also be recognized that, unlike the situation involving an outright gift, in both the
revocable trust and the interest-free loan situations, the grantor can take advantage of the
$3,000 annual exclusion provided by I.R.C. § 2503 each year. Thus, it may still be advantageous
to use an interest-free loan rather than an outright gift.
95. See O'Hare, supra note 87, at 1088-94; Note, Interest-Free Loans and the Gift Tax,
supra note 87, at 917-18; Note, Gift Taxes-Interest-Free Demand Loans Are Not Taxable
Gifts, supra note 87, at 1020.
96. See note 100 infra.
97. Reply Brief for Appellant at 27.
98. Id.
99. See generally O'Hare, supra note 87, at 1090-91; Note, Interest-Free Loans and the Gift
Tax, supra note 87, at 918.
100. The method suggested by the taxpayer in Crown was to tax as gifts those amounts
actually earned on the money loaned. Reply Brief for Appellee at 51. This method not only
ignores the fact that the use of money has value whether or not the borrower makes a bad
business decision, but also raises the problem of determining to what extent the business exper-
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on income actually earned, this method does not have the disadvantage of
basing the lender's tax liability on the business expertise of the borrower;
nor would a taxpayer be penalized by having to pay a higher gift tax than he
would if the loan were negotiated at arm's length, as would be the case were
a flat rate higher than the prime rate to be used.
Finally, it should be noted that if any quarterly assessment is adopted,
from the taxpayer's standpoint, utilizing interest-free demand loans rather
than term loans is still advantageous. Not only would there be a deferral of
the payment of gift taxes, but also the taxpayer could take advantage of the
$3,000 annual exclusion each tax year during which the loan remained out-
standing. 101
Supporting Factors in the Court's Decision
The Seventh Circuit suggested several supporting reasons for its decision.
Three of these again focused on the problem of valuation. 10 2
tise of the borrower is responsible for a successful investment. Furthermore, this method would
wreak administrative havoc whenever the borrower has used the money in various and diver-
sified investments. See generally Note, Interest-Free Loans and the Gift Tax, supra note 87, at
918. Finally, considering the rationale expounded by Congress when promulgating section 482,
which authorizes the Commissioner to allocate interest income to a lender where funds are
loaned interest-free to a controlled corporation, gross income to the debtor should be immate-
rial. Treas. Reg. § 1.48 2 -2 (a), T.D. 7394, 41 F.R. 1280 (1976) provides that where the lender is
not in the business of making loans a seven percent interest rate will be used unless the tax-
payer establishes a more appropriate rate. See Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F,2d 108
(9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v.
Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 409 U.S.
899 (1972); see also Linett, Sec. 482: Interest Income "Created" on Interest-Free Loans, 6 TAx
ADViSOR 380, 380-81 (1975). If the income earned method of valuation were to be followed, a
borrower's business ability or lack thereof becomes the measure of the gift. Clearly, this would
lead to the incongruous result of basing the lender's tax liability on the investment experience of
the borrower.
A second method that could be used would be to impose a flat rate tax as is done under
section 482. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2, T.D. 7394, 41 F.R. 1280 (1976); see generally Note,
Interest-Free Loans and the Gift Tax, supra note 87, at 913. While administratively simple, this
method is a less reliable indicator of value than the prime rate. If the prescribed rate is higher
than the prime rate, the taxpayer will be penalized by having to pay gift taxes at a higher rate
than if the transactions had been negotiated at arm's length. On the other hand, where the
prescribed rate is lower than the prime rate, the potential for tax avoidance still exists. See
O'Hare, supra note 87, at 1090; Note, Interest-Free Loans and the Gift Tax, supra note 87, at
918.
101. See note 114 infra.
102. The fourth and final supporting reason dealt with the recent decision by the Internal
Revenue Service to tax interest-free loans made between family members. Recognizing that the
statutory authority for taxing interest-free loans has been in existence as long as the gift tax
statutes themselves, the court reasoned that because the Commissioner's position was not
known until six years after the loans here at issue were made and the Commissioner had only
recently begun to claim that interest-free loans resulted in taxable gifts, it would be inequitable
to tax the transaction at bar. 585 F.2d at 241. Although it may appear unfair to impose a
retroactive tax on transactions that might have appeared tax-free at the time they were entered
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Initially, the court cited cases decided prior to the enactment of sections
482 and 483,103 which evidenced an unwillingness on the part of courts to
subject interest-free loans to taxation. 10 4  The Seventh Circuit pointed out
that under the provisions of section 482 a "safe harbor" was provided to
assure that a taxpayer's choice of an interest rate within a defined minimum
into, it is arguable whether the ruling was in fact retroactive. See Rev. Rul. 73-61 at note 48
supra. As the IRS attempted to point out, a ruling that "interprets or elucidates the meaning of
a statute . . . is merely explanatory or confirmatory and not retroactive." Reply Brief for Appel-
lant at 25, citing, Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73-75 (1965); Chock Full O'Nuts Corp.
v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1971). Even if the ruling were found to be retro-
active, it is well settled that the Commissioner is empowered to issue retroactive rulings. See
I.R.C. § 7805(b); see generally Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Ret-
roactivity, 43 TAXES 756, 760-61 (1965).
Nor is the fact that the Commissioner has only recently begun to assert that interest-free
loans give rise to taxable gifts sufficient justification for refusing to find that a taxable gift
occurred. Indeed, when one realizes that interest rates were relatively low until the mid-1950's
and that prior to 1977 a taxpayer could utilize a $30,000 lifetime exemption provided by I.R.C.
§ 2521, plus an annual exclusion of $3,000 provided by I.R.C. § 2503, it becomes apparent that
a gift-tax liability could arise only in the context of sizable loans. Brief for Appellant at 66,
citing, HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES, 329-401 (1963). For example, at an interest
rate of three percent a married couple would have had to have made an interest-free loan of
$2,200,000 before their combined lifetime exclusion and combined annual exclusion would have
been exhausted [.03 - $2,200,000 = $66,000 less (2 - $30,000 + 2 - $3,000 = $6,000)]. See
Feinschreiber and Granwell, IRS Imputes Interest on Loans Between Family Members, 51
TAxEs 294, 296 (1973); see also Brief for Appellant at 67. Even at the six percent interest rate
the IRS sought to impute in Crown; under the unified system a married couple could make an
interest-free loan of $100,000 without decreasing their unified gift and estate tax credit [.06 •
$100,000 = $6,000 less 2 - $3,000 = $6,000]. See Westover, supra note 99, at 873; Brief for
Appellant at 67. Thus, the fact that the Commissioner had only once before sought to impose a
gift tax on interest-free loans is not as surprising as the court leads one to believe. See Johnson
v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). It should be noted that with an increase in
interest rates a greater number of transactions would be subject to a gift tax. However, even at
a ten percent rate without a corresponding increase in the annual exclusion, a taxpayer could
make an interest-free loan of $60,000 without incurring any gift tax [. 10 • $60,000 = $6,000 less
2 $3,000 = $6,000].
103. I.R.C. § 482 provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (whether or not
incorporated . . .) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, cred-
its, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions ....
I.R.C. § 483 provides:
[I]n the case of any contract for the sale or exchange of property there shall be
treated as interest that part of a payment to which this section applies which bears
the same ratio to the amount of such payment as the total unstated interest under
such contract bears to the total of the payments to which this section applies which
are due under such contract.
104. 585 F.2d at 240; see also cases cited in note 12 supra. For a general discussion of
relevant case law, see O'Hare, supra note 87.
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and maximum would not be challenged. 10 5 Moreover, in dealing with in-
stallment sales under section 483, Congress exempted transactions of less
than one year or under $3,000.106 The court failed to point out, however,
that these cases and statutes dealt with income tax issues. They were not
addressed to the question of whether a gift, as that term is defined under
the gift tax statutes, had occurred.
The court next stated that because there was no statute or regulation, a
taxpayer could not know in advance whether a particular interest-free loan
would result in a taxable gift, and if it were a taxable gift, he would not
know at what rate interest would be imputed. 10 7  This was the taxpayer's
argument.108 It was based on the fact that Revenue Ruling 76-61,109 rather
than specifying the rate of interest to be charged on demand obligations,
states "the rate of interest that would represent full and adequate consider-
ation may vary, depending upon the actual circumstances pertaining to the
transaction." 110  The Commissioner acknowledged " that, absent a reliable
market rate for demand obligations, some other measure such as the average
prime rate during the period must be used. 112  Had the court accepted the
Commissioner's wholly reasonable mode of valuation, a taxpayer who makes
a loan to a family member would know in advance at what rate interest
would be imputed.
The court also expressed concern about the social ramifications and ad-
ministrative definitions involved in taxing interest-free loans between family
members or friends. 113 The court's concern, however, is exaggerated. Tax-
ation of a gift would only occur where the $3,000 annual exclusion (or $6,000
105. 585 F.2d at 240; see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a), T.D. 7394, 41 F.R. 1280 (1976).
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(b)(i) (1966) provides:
Sec. 483 shall not apply to any payment on account of the sale or exchange of
property if it can be determined at the time of such sale or exchange that the sales
price cannot exceed $3,000 .... The $3,000 exception provided by this sub-
paragraph does not apply to a contract under which payments are indefinite as to
liability or amount if the total of the payments (exclusive of interest specified in the
contract) due under the contract could exceed $3,000, notwithstanding that such
payments do not subsequently exceed such amount.
Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(1)(i) limits the applicability of § 483 to contracts "[u]nder which one or
more of the payments are due more than 1 year after the date of such sale or exchange."
107. 585 F.2d at 241.
108. Brief for Appellee at 45-46.
109. Rev. Rul. 73-61, supra note 48.
110. Id.
111. Reply Brief for Appellant at 27; see generally notes 95-101 and accompanying text supra.
112. Reply Brief for Appellant at 27, quoting, Note, Gift Taxes-Interest-Free Demand Loans
Are Not Taxable Gifts, supra note 87, at 1020.
113. The court illustrated the problem by pointing to four examples of situations where a gift
tax would be incurred: (1) if a father lends his son $1,000 to get started in a business; (2) if an
office worker lends a coworker $10.00 until payday; (3) if a neighbor borrows a lawnmower and
doesn't return it immediately; and (4) if guests spend a night in your home rather than going to
an hotel. 585 F.2d at 241.
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in the case of a married couple filing a joint return) has been used. 1 14
Clearly, this is most unlikely to occur between friends or neighbors.
Furthermore it seems anomalous to tax a loan by a father to a son when a
term when it takes the form of a demand note. 115
In sum, while at first glance these factors seem to point to a cogent ad-
ministrative reason for not taxing interest-free loans, they do not support the
court's conclusion that under section 2501 and 2512(b) 116 the transfer is
not a gift.
IMPACT
As a result of Crown, interest-free demand loans can be used effectively to
split income among family members. At the same time, the lender can re-
tain control of the principal while avoiding the payment of any gift tax. 117
For example, if a parent wanted to give a child $10,000 a year to attend
professional school," 8 he could do so by setting up a short term or revocable
trust, placing $100,000 in the trust with income to go to the child. Assuming
a ten percent return on the trust's assets, the child would receive $10,000 a
year until the trust was revoked or terminated. Under section 676,119 the
parent would be taxed on the income generated by the trust.120 Therefore,
on an annual basis, he would pay income tax on the money earned and gift
tax on any amounts over $3,000 (or $6,000 if a joint return was filed) which
were distributed to the child.121 If, on the other hand, a parent makes an
interest-free demand loan to a child, not only will the parent retain the power to
regain the principal (by demanding repayment), but also he will not be taxed
114. I.R.C. § 2503 provides that a taxpayer may give $3,000 annually to each of any number
of persons without incurring a gift tax. If married taxpayers file a joint return, they may exclude
from taxation annual gifts of $6,000 to each of any number of persons.
115. It should also be noted that under I.R.C. § 2523, the so-called split-gift provision, the
marital deduction would also be available for interest-free loans between spouses.
116. See notes 1 and 18 supra.
117. It should be noted that numerous commentators have suggested that the same results
can be obtained using a term obligation. See, e.g., Tidwell, Lester Crown Points the Way to
Estate Tax Reduction Under the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 55 TAXES 651, 654 (1977); Note,
Interest-Free Loans and the Gift Tax, supra note 87; Note, Income and Gift Tax Implications of
Interest-Free Loans Between Relatives, supra note 90, at 158-59. However, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's distinction between term and demand obligations, although dicta, leaves the viability of
term obligations open to question. 585 F.2d at 237 n.7. Because the latter can be valued at the
date of the transfer, it may be taxable under the gift tax statutes.
118. Numerous other examples could be used. For a general discussion of nonsupport trusts
see Note, Intra-Family Income Splitting: The Luxury of Nonsupport Trusts, 47 S. CALIF. L.
REV. 166 (1973).
119. I.R.C. § 676.
120. H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 14, at 28; S. REP. No. 665, supra note 14, at 40; see
Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(e) (1972), 25.2511-2(f), T.D. 7238, 37 F.R. 28728 (1972), 25.2512-5(c)
(1958); see generally Westover, supra note 90.
121. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f), T.D. 7238, 37 F.R. 28728 (1972).
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on any income generated by the loan.122 Furthermore, applying Crown, no
gift tax payment will be required. The income generated by the loan will be
taxed to the child who will most often be in a lower tax bracket. Also, if the
parent refrains from demanding return of the principal and wills the princi-
pal to the child, any tax on the transfer of the money will have been de-
ferred until the parent's death. 1
23
A second way to achieve the same result, but to avoid the taxation of
income interest to the parent, would be to establish a trust irrevocable for
more than ten years that met the requirements of sections 671-678.124
Here, although the parent would not be taxed on the income interest of the
trust, 125 he would have to pay a gift tax on the present discounted value of
the income interest. 126  Because the gift would be complete at the time of
the transfer, the parent could only take advantage of the annual exclusion for
one year-the year the gift was made. Again, if an interest-free demand
loan is used instead, the parent not only can confer the same benefit upon
the child and avoid being taxed on the income, but at the same time he will
also retain the power to recall the principal whenever he desires without
incurring gift tax liability.
Finally, as one commentator has suggested, 127 where a parent lacks the
cash to make an interest-free ' loan to a child, it may be advantageous to
collateralize his existing assets. If a taxpayer-parent owns a $1,200,000 build-
ing which produces taxable income of $120,000 a year, he can mortgage the
property for $1,000,000 cash and loan that cash to the child. Not only would
the interest payments on the mortgage be deductible against the annual in-
come produced by the building, but also the income earned on the loan
would be taxable to the child. 128
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Crown, holding that the interest-free
use of money is not a taxable gift, ignores one of the major purposes of the
gift tax statutes and opens the way to avoidance of income taxes. Moreover,
the decision is inconsistent with the statutory language of the code as inter-
122. Under I.R.C. § 61 the interest earned would be income to the borrower. It should be
noted that under the income tax statutes it may be possible to impute interest to the lender.
The issue is not yet decided. See Crown v. Commissioner, Docket No. 8889-76. See generally
O'Hare, supra note 87, at 1091-93; Note, Income and Gift Tax Implications of Interest-Free
Loans Between Relatives, supra note 90, at 158-59.
123. See generally O'Hare, supra note 87, at 1091-93; Note, Income and Gift Tax Implica-
tions of Interest-Free Loans Between Relatives, supra note 90, at 158-59.
124. I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (grantor trust provisions).
125. I.R.C. § 671 and § 673.
126. The gift tax is determined at the time of the transfer and applies whether or not the
trust actually earns any income. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9 (1970). See generally Westover, supra
note 90, at 876.




preted by the Supreme Court in Shaughnessy and Wemyss, and evidences a
preoccupation with problems of valuation that arise only in the context of
sizable loans.
By rejecting the Commissioner's contention that interest-free demand ob-
ligations can be valued at the prime rate at the end of each taxable quarter
during which the loan has remained outstanding, the decision elevates form
over substance. By tailoring an intra-family gift to fit the form of an interest-
free demand loan, a taxpayer can circumvent the stringent restrictions im-
posed on grantor trusts 129 and avoid both income and gift taxes. Further-
more, by collateralizing existing assets, even a taxpayer without cash on
hand can take advantage of the availability of interest-free demand loans to
split income among family members or to defer gift taxes on money or prop-
erty he might otherwise give outright. Until the legislature speaks or the
decision in Crown is overruled, the gaping loophole opened by the Seventh
Circuit has made what may well be a tax lawyer's dream a reality.
Virginia Hamilton Holden
129. See note 124 supra.
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